Today, Hungary’s political stance is among the most independent in the European Union. The country’s domestic and foreign policies often diverge from those of the mainstream European course. Hungary’s political leaders, including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, claim that they prioritise national interests over the union’s collective decisions, which is exactly why the country has frequently come under international scrutiny. Hungary pursues a similarly independent course in the Balkans.
Since returning to power in 2010, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his government have been consistently expanding Hungary’s relations with six countries in the Western Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro. Over the last 15 years, Budapest’s active “tactical manoeuvring” on the “Balkan track” has been aimed at achieving its primary strategic goal: finding allies outside the European Union who can join the EU in the near future, significantly strengthening Hungary’s position within the European institutions.
In Hungary, there is a political consensus concerning the further enlargement of the European Union to include the Western Balkan nations. The consensus largely stems from Hungary’s aspiration to stabilize the historically turbulent region in close proximity to its borders and to ensure the security of ethnic Hungarians living in Serbian Vojvodina (the estimates range from 180,000 to 280,000 people).
The latest, 2020 edition of Hungary’s National Security Strategy specifies in detail the role of the Western Balkans in Budapest’s foreign policy doctrine. The concerns over “new instability” in the Balkans are caused, not least, by the Hungarian political establishment’s historical memory of the 1990s, when armed conflicts broke out in close proximity to Hungary and eventually led to the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia in 1999.
The primary long-term goals of Viktor Orbán’s government in relation to the Western Balkan states remain their European integration and NATO membership. With a certain degree of caution, Serbia can be called an exception as it is not overtly a pro-NATO state, but maintains close ties with the Alliance and regularly conducts joint military exercises with it. Hungary supports Brussels’ negotiations with Belgrade and Podgorica, advocating the speedy initiation of “pre-accession dialogue” with Skopje and Tirana.
Hungary has turned the 2015 “migrant crisis” into a “watertight argument” to accelerate the EU expansion process. This was primarily driven by the fact that one of the main refugee routes to Europe passes through and is controlled by the Balkan states. It seems quite obvious that a new flow of migrants, triggered by yet another wave of instability in the Middle East – primarily the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – will again be used by Orbán to promote his “integration agenda”.
The Hungarian government also sees enlargement as the “most important tool for strengthening the EU”, especially following events like Brexit (notably, in 2016, Orbán stood up against Britain’s exit from the European Union). That is why Hungary calls on the other EU member states and European institutions to accelerate the “consolidation process”. The Hungarian Prime Minister has repeatedly criticised the European Commission for claiming that EU enlargement is impossible until 2025 (the Ukrainian crisis has slowed down this integration process even further).
Hungary has also traditionally called on the Visegrád Group (V4) countries to take on a more active role in the European integration of the Balkans. Prior to 2022, the region was the V4’s main external policy priority, as cooperation within the “Eastern Partnership” initiative was increasingly losing momentum. On June 28, 2021, during the Polish presidency of the Visegrád Group, Rogalin hosted the latest so far (and previously annual) meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the V4 and Western Balkan countries, with the participation of the EU Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue and the Croatian Foreign Minister. Despite the formal suspension of these processes due to the COVID pandemic and the conflict in Ukraine, Hungary has not withdrawn from these cooperation formats, nor has it refused to support the Polish “Three Seas Initiative” (or 3SI), which can potentially be expanded to include the Balkan states.
An equally important “regional goal” of the Hungarian government is strengthening ties with its ideological allies. This would allow Budapest not only to claim its role as a formal representative of Western Balkan interests in the EU, but also as a real leader in a future coalition of national regional conservative parties in opposition to Brussels, as well as to gradually strengthen its position in the European Parliament as its “Balkan neighbours” join the European Union.
Hungary’s efforts in the Balkans indicate that, when choosing regional partners, Orbán’s government is primarily guided by ideological compatibility with political parties, establishing cooperation with them even if they are not in power. “Eurocrats” believe that this undermines the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkan states. At the same time, it is becoming clearer even within the EU itself that Hungary’s current policy is aimed at creating an alliance that advocates for strong nation-states in Europe.
However, Brussels is hitting back by criticising Budapest, noting that several priority partners of the Hungarian government among the EU candidates in the Balkans – most notably Serbia – are not doing enough to address corruption or ensure the rule of law, ignoring the recommendations of the European institutions.
For example, Orbán supports VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity), the largest opposition party of North Macedonia. While in power from 2006 to 2017, this party, despite its name, often acted undemocratically, which was noted by the Council of Europe, among other institutions.
Serbia is Budapest’s most important partner in the region. It is the only Western Balkan country bordering Hungary, which offers opportunities for developing economic ties but also carries the risk of instability spillover. Given Budapest’s special attention to the Balkan migration route, Belgrade is viewed as Budapest’s partner and a “security provider” not only for Hungary but for the entire European Union. In addition, Serbia is the only country in the region with a large ethnic Hungarian population.
Over the last decade, one of the key foreign policy priorities for Orbán’s government has been its partnership with Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). It is this factor that has brought the interstate cooperation of the two countries to the level of a strategic partnership.
Budapest uses economic cooperation with the Western Balkans as a “working tool” to achieve its foreign policy goals in the region. Although the economic importance of the Western Balkans for Budapest is not formally documented, the growing volume of Hungarian investment in the region speaks for itself. Hungary’s foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans amounted to €690 million in 2015, whereas by 2020, this figure had risen sharply to €1.5 billion.
In 2020, the Hungarian Export Promotion Agency launched the “Western Balkans Investment Scheme” for Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro with a capital of €7 million. In April 2024, €140 million was allocated to Republika Srpska for infrastructure, agriculture, and energy projects. In July 2025, North Macedonia received a €500 million loan from the Hungarian Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) to finance transport infrastructure development.
Hungary is also a key player in the Serbian economy. By the end of 2022, Budapest had become one of Belgrade’s top five foreign trade partners, and by December 2024, the two countries’ bilateral trade turnover had reached €4 billion. In addition, Hungary has expanded its economic presence in Serbia via the Vojvodina Economic Development Program, which was initiated in 2016 and is managed by the Prosperitati Foundation. The program offers grants and subsidized loans to local entrepreneurs, farmers, and small and medium-sized enterprises to stimulate cross-border cooperation and increase the economic footprint of the Hungarian minority in Northern Serbia.
Official figures show that thousands of local residents have received support since the program was launched, with direct investments amounting to several hundred million euros. Such economic diplomacy serves as an instrument of Budapest’s strategy: Hungary bolsters its position in the Western Balkans by linking the region’s economic development to cultural and political initiatives. For Serbia, this cooperation provides access to funds, technology, and EU markets, strengthening the pragmatic and mutually beneficial Hungarian-Serbian relations.
Hungary is not only actively investing in Vojvodina but is also seeking to extend its investments to other parts of Serbia. Following the opening of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce’s Information Centre and an Honorary Consulate in Kragujevac (a city in the West of Serbia) in 2018, honorary consulates have been established in three other Serbian cities to reinforce trade and investment cooperation between the two countries.
In 2025, Hungary and the countries of the region significantly intensified their diplomatic contacts. Between June 1 and July 1, 2025, high-ranking Hungarian officials – including Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó, and Minister for National Economy Márton Nagy – held a series of meetings with leaders from across the region.
Hungary has historically maintained close ties with Serbia, Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia. Today, Budapest is actively working to strengthen its ties with other states of the region as well.
The Orbán government has recently placed a particular focus on Montenegro. Signing a bilateral cooperation agreement in July 2025 to develop infrastructure, telecommunications, information technology, and law enforcement has turned Montenegro into another key priority for Budapest.
ENERGY INDUSTRY AND LOGISTICS. RUSSIAN AND CHINESE INTERESTS
In its economic cooperation with the Western Balkans, Hungary pays special attention to the energy sector. Since February 2022, Hungary has seen the Balkans as a strategic corridor for energy imports, with Serbia playing a key role in the diversification of energy supplies.
Currently, Hungary relies primarily on Serbia for its natural gas imports. This is a significant shift, since between 2019 and 2021, 70% of Hungary’s gas imports came from the Ukrainian pipeline. This transition has made Serbia a much more important player in ensuring Hungary’s energy security. The Hungarian-Serbian natural gas partnership is mutually beneficial: the Hungarian government recognizes Serbia as a reliable transit country, while the Serbian supplies depend on Hungary’s gas storage capacities.
Hungary began constructing interconnectors as early as 2009, while facing the consequences of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine. Following this incident, Budapest diversified its gas transit routes and began to rely more heavily on the TurkStream/Balkan Stream pipeline network. The new transit route for Russian gas supply from Serbia to Hungary was opened in 2021. This pipeline section has become crucial for Hungary’s economy and its energy security following the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine.
Hungary possesses five gas storage facilities with the total capacity of 5.01 billion cubic metres, whereas Serbia has only one storage site at Banatski Dvor with the capacity of 450 million cubic metres. In June 2022, Serbian and Hungarian officials reached an agreement allowing Serbia to store 500 million cubic metres of gas in Hungary for the heating season.
On June 20, 2023, Viktor Orbán and Aleksandar Vučić signed a memorandum to extend the Druzhba oil pipeline to the Serbian city of Novi Sad. Due to sanctions, Serbia cannot import Russian crude oil via Croatia (the JANAF pipeline). The agreement with Hungary is intended to enable Serbia to receive Russian oil via the Druzhba pipeline, which so far remains exempt from current EU sanctions. The memorandum confirmed that Hungary and Serbia remain committed to a pragmatic relationship with Russia in the energy sector, despite the EU sanctions.
In July 2025, Hungary and Serbia discussed with Russia the possibility of constructing a new oil pipeline that from 2027 on would ensure Russian oil supplies between the two countries and would essentially represent a 180-kilometer extension of the Druzhba pipeline.
Another joint Hungarian-Serbian project is the construction of a new oil pipeline, which is scheduled to begin in 2026.
Although Serbia was exempted from EU sanctions against Russian companies, Gazprom Neft had to reduce its stake in the Serbian oil and gas company NIS.
The Hungarian company MOL, which has acquired a stake of the company’s shares, remains interested in regional expansion and is considering further acquisitions (earlier, MOL invested in the Polish market, became the largest shareholder in Croatia’s INA oil company, and secured 92% of Slovenia’s second-largest fuel retailer, OMV Slovenija).
Nuclear power is yet another potential area of Hungarian-Serbian cooperation involving Russia.
In October 2022, President Vučić expressed interest in acquiring a 5-10% stake in Hungary’s Paks II nuclear power plant to ensure a sufficient electricity supply and enhance Serbia’s long-term energy security. One of Vučić’s primary goals is to keep energy prices down; this earns the politician “extra points” with the electorate and reduces the risks of foreign industrial investors leaving Serbia due to high electricity costs.
The last few years have seen a surge in China’s presence in both Hungary and Serbia. Beijing is actively seeking to expand its influence in the Balkans. Chinese companies are increasing their investment into new projects in both countries, primarily in manufacturing hubs in Hungary and Serbia. China intends to establish a manufacturing foothold in the Central European region of the EU, taking advantage of favourable investment conditions to position itself as a key partner in the infrastructure and logistics chains of the region.
Hungary hosts the large China-Europe Business and Logistics Cooperation Park, which integrates various enterprises, e-commerce, and all types of logistics. China has become Serbia’s active partner in large infrastructure projects, the most prominent of which is the high-speed railway line between Belgrade and Budapest, developed by a consortium of Chinese companies, including China Railway International and China Communications Construction Company. The Serbian section of the route was opened in October 2025.
Chinese loans account for 85% of the project’s funding, with Budapest and Belgrade covering the remaining 15% of the costs from their budgets. This railway, which will serve as a logistics corridor from Serbia to Hungary (and, more broadly, from the Greek port of Piraeus to Central Europe), is described by the Chinese side as one of the main projects of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Europe.
SECURITY ISSUES IN THE REGION
Hungary is playing an active part in security efforts in the Western Balkans. Hungarian military personnel are deployed in peacekeeping missions in the region as part of the European Union Force (EUFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Notably, Hungary is a key Central European participant in NATO’s KFOR mission, and Hungarian Major General Ferenc Kajári served as KFOR Commander in 2021-2022. Around 700 Hungarian soldiers have served in Kosovo, which reflects Budapest’s ambition to be seen as a serious player in the region’s security provision. In March 2025, a rotation of Hungarian troops deployed in Kosovo began, with 280 new soldiers gradually replacing their colleagues.
Hungary remains deeply involved in EUFOR Althea activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including rapid response exercises that test the mission readiness, with Hungarian reservists working in cooperation with EUFOR units. Through these activities, Hungary retains a steady presence in the region.
Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Kosovo, are identified as key potential threats to Hungary in its National Security Strategy, which legitimizes large Hungarian peacekeeping deployments in these areas. The close ties with the regime in Republika Srpska add an extra dimension to Hungary’s political relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Orbán seeks to demonstrate political alignment with Milorad Dodik, President of Republika Srpska. The Prime Minister has received Milorad Dodik in Budapest on several occasions even amid discussions about imposing sanctions against the Bosnian Serb leader by the EU.
In August 2025, the Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina stripped the President of Republika Srpska of his mandate; however, he refused to resign. Western media reports suggest that Hungary’s Counter-Terrorism Centre (Terrorelhárítási Központ, TEK) has allegedly prepared a secret operation to evacuate Milorad Dodik in the event that the Bosnian authorities attempt to arrest him. In response to these reports, Bosnia and Herzegovina demanded the withdrawal of the Hungarian peacekeepers from the EUFOR mission due to the close ties between Hungarian officials and Milorad Dodik.
Serbia is Hungary’s major partner in ensuring regional security in the Balkans. In 2023, Belgrade and Budapest signed an agreement on strategic cooperation in the field of defence. In June 2025, the document was extended: the parties finalised a bilateral military interaction plan for 2025, which provides for almost 80 joint initiatives, ranging from military manoeuvres and peacekeeping operations to cooperation in the defence industry.
This agreement should be viewed against the backdrop of the ongoing militarisation and the emergence of new military formations in the Western Balkans.
In March 2025, Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo signed a trilateral defence declaration, which indicates intensification of security processes in the region. The three Balkan countries undertook to reach a closer integration of their defence strategies and systems. The trilateral agreement stipulates four major priorities that are to ensure security and peace amidst growing instability in South-East Europe. They include: development of the military potential with joint investments into industry, reaching interoperability of the armed forces, reduction of hybrid threats by exchanging intelligence data, and facilitation of Kosovo integration into the NATO defence ecosystem. It was also stated that the North Atlantic Alliance remains open to expansion beyond the Western Balkans.
Serbia denounced this pact as a provocation and responded by expanding its cooperation with Hungary. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić characterised the agreement as a step toward a military alliance between the two countries, reflecting both deeper political ties in the field of security provision and Budapest’s broader ambitions in the Balkans and South-East Europe.
At the same time, North Macedonia is gaining importance as a transit country on the Balkan migration route, which has a direct link to Hungary’s security issues, with the 2015 migrant crisis still fresh in its leaders’ minds.
Security and telecommunications are closely intertwined in Hungary’s policy in the Balkans. Currently, the Hungarian 4iG Group owns the leading telecommunications operators not only in Hungary but also in the Western Balkans: ONE Crna Gora in Montenegro, ONE Albania in Albania, and One Macedonia Telecommunications in North Macedonia.
Western media believe that the leaders of the 4iG Group belong to Viktor Orbán’s inner circle, and that the company’s rapid growth has been aided by the direct support of the Prime Minister and the Hungarian Ministry of Defence.
Notably, the 4iG Group includes 4iG Space and Defense Technologies (4iG SDT), a separate holding company that consolidates the Group’s aerospace and defence interests. 4iG SDT has already secured strategic cooperation with the leading global defence and aerospace players, such as Rheinmetall, EDGE Group (from the UAE), and L3Harris Technologies and Boeing (from the US). The company is taking further steps to strengthen its market standing in the near future: 4iG SDT and the Hungarian state company N7 have come to an agreement to establish the first Hungarian public-private defence holding. According to the agreement, 4iG SDT will acquire a 75% majority stake of the defence holding.
Given the strategic importance of the telecommunications sector not only for the economy but also for digital security, and the fact that the 4iG Group is involved in military research and development, Hungary has every opportunity to strengthen its influence in this sphere.
CONCLUSIONS.
Budapest’s policy in the Western Balkans combines
economic and political interests with energy and security concerns. Hungary is expanding its influence through preferential loans, deeper political and energy cooperation, as well as collaboration in the field of security and technology with the countries of the region.
However, there is a clear imbalance: some countries (like Serbia, North Macedonia, and Montenegro) or entities (Republika Srpska) are Hungary’s full-fledged strategic partners, while others (such as Albania and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina) receive significantly less attention and support.
Hungary’s most important partner in the region is Serbia. Budapest aims to broaden its footprint in the Western Balkans and to shape the EU expansion process in accordance with the Orbán government’s strategic and ideological vision. Hungary’s aim is to become a full-scale representative of Western Balkan interests in the European Union, while simultaneously forming a coalition against the federalisation of the EU and its excessive bureaucracy.
In developing bilateral relations, Budapest takes into account its historical ties with the Balkan countries, their economic prospects, and positions of potential partners on a range of issues – from cooperation with Russia and China to their stance on the Ukrainian crisis.
As a result, European countries view Hungary’s actions in the Western Balkans as promoting Russian and Chinese interests, even though Hungarian politicians build their “Balkan Strategy” upon their own national security interests.
The future of these dynamic relations will depend on the outcome of the 2026 parliamentary elections. Experts suggest that the Hungarian opposition is ready to follow Brussels’ agenda on illegal migration and to support the pro-EU political factions in the region.
Evgeny Osenkov, director of
Russian-Balkan Dialogue Center for International Cooperation
