In recent years, Russian politicians and diplomats have increasingly turned to the legacy of Aleksandr Gorchakov. This trend reflects the changes in Russian foreign policy that have taken place following the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. This historical parallel is quite pertinent as history has much to teach us. However, not every political leader is able and willing to learn its lessons.
Prince Aleksandr Gorchakov embodies an epoch of Russian diplomacy – one that deserves special scrutiny. We do not intend to recount the minister’s biography, but only aim to show the role of the individual in shaping resilient and potent diplomacy in Russia under specific economic and socio-political conditions that bear a strong resemblance to those of today. We would also like to highlight the traditional practices of Russian diplomacy which could have made a difference during the New Eastern Crisis of the late 20th century.
Russian historiography has so far largely overlooked the subjective, personal factor in foreign policy. However, we should emphasize a specific feature of the Russian Tsarist political structure. Foreign and home policy decisions in Russia were often influenced by individual people, their connections inside and outside the country, their education, origin, and leverage on the tsar, the mood of the tsar and his entourage. It is this tradition that Prince Gorchakov sought to break when he advised Alexander II that ‘no minister shall be privileged to converse with the emperor, much less to report to him in private’. However, the Prince failed to realize his ambition. Today’s situation in Russia is virtually the same.
The history of the 19th century and more recent events have shown that the Foreign Minister in Russia has always been an important figure in shaping and executing foreign policy objectives.
Aleksandr Gorchakov began his tenure as Foreign Minister in 1856 when Russia was struggling to overcome her foreign policy and military catastrophe – defeat in the Crimean War. Harsh peace terms. Loss of the country’s international prestige. Exclusion of Russian diplomacy from the European political arena, depriving it of the ability to influence European affairs and weakening the Russian position in the Balkans and the Middle East. Replacement of Russia’s exclusive right to protect Christians with collective guarantees. Such were the conditions in which Gorchakov had to start his tenure as Foreign Minister. Diplomatic isolation proved to be a heavy burden for Russia. All this was taking place amidst economic devastation and backwardness.
Unlike his predecessor, Karl Nesselrode, Gorchakov attempted to pursue an independent foreign policy, placing Russia’s national interests at its centre. It was Gorchakov’s commitment to ‘Russian interests’ that European diplomats and Nesselrode found so unsettling. According to a contemporary, ‘Metternich did not like Prince Gorchakov for his Russian soul, for his Russian sentiment, for his unyielding position in negotiations…’. It was Metternich who interfered in the Russian diplomatic appointments through Nesselrode and successfully blocked Gorchakov’s assignment to Vienna and Tsargrad (Constantinople) in 1841. The minister also objected to Gorchakov’s assignment as Head of the Russian diplomatic mission in Vienna in 1854, but the Tsar insisted. ‘I have appointed him because he is Russian’, Nicholas I retorted.
Russia was faced with the task of consolidating her resources to change her foreign policy course in parallel with domestic reforms. The European monarchs did not expect the defeated Russia to rise from her knees so soon and find her voice. Yet, the new minister’s voice rang up rather loudly. At least, he was heard. In his famous circular to Russian ambassadors in European capitals dated 21 August 1856, Aleksandr Gorchakov formulated the basic principle of the new political course as ‘Russia is not sulking; she is concentrating’. It meant that Russia refrained from active intervention in European affairs while recovering from the defeat. At the same time, Prince Gorchakov declared that Russia had no intention of sacrificing her own interests to uphold the principles of the Holy Alliance. Gorchakov’s doctrines were discussed by all the European governments. His principles formulated in the circular – “to pursue the national policy without sacrificing Russia’s interests for the sake of alien political goals” and “to strive to live in good agreement with all governments” – outlined the future benchmarks of Russian foreign policy.
While Russia was ‘concentrating’, Gorchakov transformed the Ministry, revised the foreign policy decision-making process (draft – interdepartmental consultations – the Tsar), expanded the consular network, made new appointments to the Russian diplomatic corps abroad (with most of the consular posts in the Middle East now held by diplomats of Russian origin), and established the journal ‘Diplomatic Yearbook’ (‘Annuaire diplomatique de l’Empire de Russie’).
Gradually, Russian diplomacy was gathering its strength. Its primary aim was to restore the international prestige of the country. It is Aleksandr Gorchakov who fostered significant changes in Russia’s foreign policy and diplomacy. During the period of 1858-1866, he outlined the following goals for Russian diplomacy: ‘1) through political combinations to change the system of alliances and shift the European balance of power, which had been directed to our detriment by the Treaty of 1856; 2) to accelerate the development of the Christian population in Turkey, whose entry into political life would give us natural allies and guarantees of a better balance’. The primary objective of Russia’s policy in the Balkans was to overturn the Treaty of Paris and regain her lost influence on the Balkan Peninsula. Gorchakov was a staunch advocate of setting Russia on a new path – one of renewal and reform – aimed to reclaim her position on the European stage.
In the 1850s, despite her inability to pursue an active foreign policy, Russia strove ‘for the maintenance of Orthodoxy and feelings of devotion to kindred Russia among the Southern Slavs’. The tactics were quite straightforward: to expand Russia’s presence in all spheres – political, cultural, religious, and charitable – to maintain and enhance her prestige.
The 1860s saw a marked increase in Saint Petersburg’s diplomatic efforts in the East. Aleksandr Gorchakov repeatedly suggested calling a conference of the Great Powers to discuss the status and condition of Christian peoples in Turkey. The Russian government strengthened its ties with Serbia and resumed financial aid to Montenegro. Aleksandr Gorchakov believed that Serbia was to play a special role in the Balkans. ‘Serbia shall become the nucleus around which the grouping will take place, or the fulcrum for the Christian peoples when they decide to shake off Ottoman rule’, he said. The French Ambassador to Saint Petersburg, Montebello, once wrote of Gorchakov’s policy: ‘He saved Russia’s credit in the eyes of the Christian population… If Europe does little for them, Russia intends to do much’.
The Eastern crisis of the 1870s broke out at the sunset of Gorchakov’s diplomatic career. His physical frailty left him unable to stand up to his strong rivals in the international arena – Otto von Bismarck and Gyula Andrássy – and domestic advocates of active support for the Slavic cause. Aleksandr Gorchakov firmly believed that all conflicts should be resolved through diplomacy, averting wars by means of compromise. According to Russian historians, Gorchakov’s passivity, failing health and frequent absences contributed to the prolongation of the conflict.
Despite winning the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, Russia emerged significantly weakened and had to yield to the pressure of the Western countries. Gorchakov failed to engage the European powers in a joint effort to improve the condition of the Slavic peoples, which allowed Britain to demand a revision of the Treaty of San Stefano.
The decision to play the ‘Bulgarian card’, the pursuit of a Greater Bulgaria – ignoring at the same time the interests of Serbia (Russia’s ally in the war against Turkey) – led to a rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria, a clash of the Serbian and Bulgarian positions on the Macedonian question. It also prompted Serbia to realign its foreign policy toward Austria-Hungary, caused disillusionment with Russia among the Serbian political elite and a deep rift that plagued the Serbian society in the 1880-1890s.
At the Congress of Berlin, where the terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were revised, Russia’s interests were represented by an already feeble Gorchakov, who was unable even to rise from his chair. Equally feeble was his country’s position. The result was detrimental, first and foremost, to the Slavic nations. The Congress of Berlin became ‘the darkest page’ of the minister’s life, as he himself admitted.
The sunset of Aleksandr Gorchakov’s career marked the end of an entire era in the history of Russia’s foreign policy defined by a tremendous rise and subsequent decline. As Gorchakov wrote to Alexander II in June of 1878, Russia had returned to its familiar state of 1856 and ‘was to concentrate’ once again.
Thus, we can draw several conclusions about how Aleksandr Gorchakov’s diplomatic efforts and vision shaped the diplomacy that placed Russia on an equal footing with other leading European nations. Several fundamental principles of Russian diplomacy can be formulated – principles that made the nation’s policy successful and the nation itself strong:
- Even in the face of military defeat and economic backwardness, a state must have a well-defined foreign policy strategy with clear priorities.
- With such a strategy, the most significant results are brought by the independence of the Foreign Minister’s judgement and finely-tuned tactics.
- Foreign policy should be active.
- Russia should not confine itself to one foreign policy direction but pursue a multi-vector approach.
- The alignment of allies and adversaries should be flexible.
- The autonomy of the foreign policy should not depend directly on the country’s economic condition.
- The state should not abandon its spheres of influence, even if it is weakened economically. Foreign policy should be based on diplomatic manoeuvring and finesse, as well as moral influence that incurs no economic costs.
- The greatest progress in the system of international relations is achieved by establishing both a balance of power and a balance of rights. It was crucial for Gorchakov to maintain a balance of power between Russia, Germany, Britain, France, and Austria.
- The Slavic cause in the Balkans cannot be settled in favour of the Slavic peoples without Russia. There is a direct correlation between the Western expansionism in the Balkans and the weakness of Russia.
- It is vital not to cling to office into old age, but rather to bring up a new generation of diplomats, nurturing the traditions of Russian diplomacy and instilling in the youth a love for history.
Gorchakov’s wisdom and adherence to principle compelled other European diplomats to seek compromise. The minister was well aware of the ‘hidden springs’ of the diplomatic mechanism and skillfully manoeuvred through the waters of European diplomacy. Aleksandr Gorchakov was a master of diplomatic manoeuvre and international combinations. Equally important in diplomacy is decisiveness. It was this quality that played a key role in the abrogation of the humiliating clauses of the Treaty of Paris.
It is important to emphasize that Gorchakov’s views stood apart from the controversy between ‘Westernizers’ and ‘Slavophiles’. He was a truly Russian statesman whose views and policy were solely guided by Russia’s own interests. Never distancing Russia from Europe, he always kept the country’s national goals in sight. In this regard, a great role was played by the minister’s inner convictions, his patriotism, his ‘Russian soul’ and ‘Russian sentiment’.
Many of the Russian diplomatic techniques, which were successfully employed by Aleksandr Gorchakov, were, unfortunately, lost during the 1990s.
